Monetary Policy in East Asia: Common Concerns by Marvin Goodfriend
 









INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 




You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 
































NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies.   IMES Discussion Paper Series 2007-E-18 
September 2007 
 
Monetary Policy in East Asia: Common Concerns 
 
 
Marvin Goodfriend * 
 
Abstract 
  The paper identifies and evaluates consequences for monetary policy of five 
features of East Asian development: export orientation, integrated regional trade, 
bank-dependent finance, the potential for persistent trade surpluses, and the 
aggressive accumulation of international reserves.  The case for a flexible exchange 
rate is made in terms of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS). NNS logic indicates 
why fluctuations in "export optimism" create problems for the sustainability of a 
fixed exchange rate. Cooperative credit policy in East Asia is discussed by analogy to 
a credit union. The paper outlines problems for monetary policy created by 
bank-dependent finance in East Asia. A two-country NNS model indicates that a 
revaluation of the RMB against the dollar is likely to exert little effect on the US trade 
deficit, although it should help control inflation in China.  The paper argues that 
China can adopt a flexible exchange rate in a few years with modest reforms of its 
banking system. Finally, the paper considers various reasons for the accumulation of 
international reserves in East Asia. 
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1. Introduction 
  East Asia is home to a diverse collection of economies ranging in size from the largest 
countries to the smallest city states. The regional economies are in various stages of two great 
transitions----from central planning or extensive regulation to a reliance on markets, and from the 
use of traditional production processes to the application of modern industrial techniques.  
  Yet, the countries of East Asia have a number of distinctive characteristics in common. For 
the most part, they have been export-oriented and many have succeeded consistently over time in 
improving the attractiveness of their exports to the developed world.  Per capita products throughout 
the region have been converging to those of the industrialized world. Rapid productivity growth has 
been achieved by importing technology from abroad and building on that technology to produce 
evermore desirable goods for export and greater efficiency of labor at home.
1 Productivity growth 
and export success have moved the real terms of trade higher over time, providing an additional 
boost to well-being by steadily increasing the value of East Asian products at world prices. 
  Highly integrated regional trade is another manifestation of East Asian development. In 
particular, there is thriving regional trade in intermediate-goods. The proximity of nations with 
vastly different labor costs and technological capabilities creates opportunities for savings in the 
production of high-valued goods. The region is famous for locating the various stages of production 
of goods where they are most cheaply executed. Technologically advanced countries produce 
sophisticated core electronic components such as computer chips. Core components are shipped to 
less developed countries for assembly where labor costs are lower. The components are assembled, 
packaged, and shipped to export markets overseas as part of the so called "processing trade" in 
countries with relatively cheap labor.   
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Goodfriend and McDermott (1998). 2 
  In the financial sphere, the economies of East Asia share a high degree of bank dependence 
accompanied by relatively thin corporate bond markets.  In large part, this legacy derives from a 
history of government direction of economic activity. The relative absence of opportunities for 
direct borrowing and lending in the capital markets served to enhance the power of banking 
institutions to work closely with business allies and political officials to direct credit to favored 
borrowers.  In recent years, banking crises in East Asian countries resulted in part from poorly run 
and inadequately regulated financial intermediaries. The relative lack of alternative non-bank 
financial intermediation, in turn, made entire economies more vulnerable to banking problems than 
is the case where corporate bond markets are more developed.  In China, the banking system must 
be strengthened to enable the country to adopt independent monetary policy with a fully flexible 
exchange rate. 
  The economies of East Asia famously share a high saving rate.  The high saving rate is 
related to the two great transitions and to the underdeveloped financial markets.  Although many 
East Asian countries have absorbed domestic savings in domestic investment on average, 
investment has fallen short of desired saving for extend periods in many countries, producing large 
and persistent trade surpluses. For instance, Japan long has had persistent trade surpluses, and in the 
last few years China, too, has run an overall trade surplus.   
  The aggressive accumulation of international reserves by many East Asian central banks has 
been a prominent feature of East Asian economic development. Lately, an unprecedented 
acquisition of international reserves by the Peoples Bank of China has been claimed as evidence 
that China manipulates its currency for competitive advantage in international trade. As discussed 
below, East Asian central banks have had a variety of motives for accumulating international 
reserves.   
  This paper identifies and evaluates consequences for monetary policy of the five 3 
abovementioned features of East Asian development: 1) export orientation, 2) highly integrated 
regional trade, 3) bank-dependent finance, 4) the potential for persistent trade surpluses, and 5) the 
aggressive accumulation of international reserves.
2  
  We begin in Section 2 by presenting the case for inflation targeting with a flexible exchange 
rate in terms of the New Neoclassical Synthesis. The case against a fixed exchange rate is made 
with reference to fluctuations in "export optimism" such as appear to have occurred prior to the East 
Asian currency collapse of 1997. Section 3 considers the case for cooperative credit policy in East 
Asia in light of the potential for financial contagion that extensive regional trade entails. In Section 
4 the paper describes the problems that bank-dependent finance, political interference in banking, 
and thin corporate bond markets create for monetary policy in East Asia.  
  Section 5 uses a two-country New Synthesis model to argue that a revaluation of the 
Chinese RMB exchange rate against the US dollar is likely to exert little if any direct influence on 
the US trade deficit, although it should help to control Chinese inflation. Section 5 then insists that 
what China needs is a flexible exchange rate, not a revaluation or a sequence of managed 
revaluations, and argues that China can adopt an inflation target and float its currency in a few years 
with modest reforms of its banking system. Section 6 considers three reasons in light of monetary 
and exchange rate policies why East Asian central banks have aggressively accumulated 
international reserves. A brief summary concludes the paper.   
2. The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates and the Fragility of Fixed Rates in East Asia 
   The case for a flexible exchange rate in the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) is based on 
the case for targeting inflation in a closed economy originated in Goodfriend and King (1997).
3 The 
idea is that a monetary economy has a monopolistically competitive real business cycle (RBC) core 
in which firms have pricing power over the differentiated goods that they produce. If prices were 
                                                 
2 Bank for International Settlements (2006) is a good overview of East Asian monetary policy in practice. 
3 See also Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), and Woodford (2003).  4 
costless to adjust, then monopolistically competitive firms would sustain the flexible-price profit-
maximizing markup at all times, and the economy would display aggregate fluctuations due to 
supply shocks---shocks to productivity, the terms of trade, or the labor force, etc. Monetary policy 
would have little role in stabilization policy and business cycles would be efficient in the sense that 
they would occur in spite of the fact that prices were fully flexible.  
  However, frictions associated with the use of money---pricing in money units and the costly 
adjustment of differentiated product prices---cause the behavior of the NNS economy to deviate 
from that of its RBC core. Firms adjust employment to accommodate fluctuations in demand at 
sticky money prices. Fluctuating conditions in the labor market, in turn, influence unit labor costs. 
For instance, excessive aggregate demand increases employment, raises unit labor costs, 
compresses markups, and creates inflationary potential. If the central bank has credibility for low 
inflation, then firms adjust prices little in response to current shocks and policy actions, and instead 
expect interest rate policy to act on labor market conditions to restore the flexible-price profit-
maximizing markup at unchanged prices.   
  Frictions associated with the use of money expose the NNS economy to inefficient 
fluctuations associated with temporary deviations of actual from flexible-price markups. By the 
same token, sticky prices provide the leverage for monetary policy to influence employment and 
output.  The NNS perspective with its RBC core recommends that interest rate policy act to stabilize 
actual markups at profit-maximizing markups to make the NNS economy behave as if prices were 
fully flexible.  
  A key idea is that by stabilizing inflation, monetary policy also stabilizes actual markups at 
flexible-price profit-maximizing markups. Otherwise, firms would not be content to raise prices at 
the targeted rate of inflation.  Hence, the NNS framework implies that inflation targeting is welfare-
maximizing monetary policy.  Of course, problems associated with modeling, forecasting, and 5 
measurement prevent interest rate policy from stabilizing inflation perfectly.  So frictions associated 
with the use of money and with monetary policy inevitably superimpose inefficient fluctuations or 
"bad" business fluctuations cycles on "good" real business cycles.  
  Some prices, such as those for energy and food, are typically more flexible than others.  So 
the question arises, should targeted inflation include flexible as well as sticky prices, or should a 
core measure of inflation be targeted? The NNS perspective suggests that monetary policy should 
target the measure of inflation that allows the economy to behave as much like its flexible-price 
RBC core as possible.  Hence, core sticky-price inflation should be targeted and flexible-prices 
should be allowed to adjust freely relative to core prices.  
  NNS reasoning carries over to an open economy that imports a share of consumption goods 
at a foreign-currency price given in world markets and exports output at a foreign-currency price 
given in world markets.
4 Monetary policy should target a core index of domestic-currency 
denominated prices of goods and services produced for domestic use by monopolistically 
competitive firms. Export and import prices should be free to adjust relative to targeted core prices. 
Domestic currency prices of exports and imports would fluctuate due to movements in foreign-
currency prices, and partly with respect to fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate.  That said, 
import prices could be included in the targeted index to the extent that the domestic value added due 
to transportation and marketing, etc., is a significant part of cost.      
  The capacity for national monetary policies to overcome monetary frictions by targeting 
inflation depends critically on the nature of international monetary arrangements. In order for 
interest rate policy to target domestic inflation, a country must allow its exchange rate to float on 
the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate must be flexible to support fluctuations in the real 
terms of trade consistent with domestic real business cycles, since the national NNS economy must 
                                                 
4 Goodfriend (2007) and references contained therein make this point. 6 
behave like its RBC core to stabilize inflation. 
  The case for a flexible exchange rate is particularly strong for rapidly developing export-
oriented economies such as those in East Asia, economies that can expect to improve the 
attractiveness of their exports to the developed world over time and thereby steadily improve their 
terms of trade.  The reason is that interest rate policy forced to support a fixed or managed exchange 
rate is no longer available to stabilize domestic inflation and employment.  And fluctuations in 
"export optimism" subsequently found to be excessive can readily create a conflict between 
stabilizing the exchange rate and stabilizing domestic employment and inflation. Specifically, 
excessive optimism about the improvement of the terms of trade that is reversed subsequently can 
create a credibility crisis for a fixed exchange rate regime.
5    
  The argument goes as follows.
6 Suppose that export optimism raises the expected East Asian 
terms of trade. Since both East Asian and US residents wish to smooth consumption over time, East 
Asian residents borrow against the brighter future income prospects associated with the improved 
terms of trade and US residents lend against the expected deterioration of their terms of trade. 
Hence, capital flows from the US to East Asia, and East Asia runs a trade deficit with the US.  
  Given the home bias in consumption, the East Asian trade deficit increases demand in East 
Asia. Because prices are sticky initially, employment rises, wages rise, markups are compressed 
relative to profit-maximizing markups. Firms raise prices to restore their profit-maximizing 
markups, and inflation raises East Asian real exchange rates relative to the US. These outcomes 
resemble those of the East Asian "miracle" in the years preceding the 1997 currency crisis.
7   
  The problem is this: A subsequent moderation of excessive export optimism may narrow or 
reverse the East Asian trade deficit and contract demand in East Asia. In this case East Asian price 
                                                 
5 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Hussain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005).  
6 The discussion is based on analysis developed in Goodfriend (2007).  
7 Glick (1999). 7 
levels that have already adjusted upward in response to excessive export optimism are exposed to 
deflationary pressure. At this point, the East Asian fixed exchange rate commitment is called into 
question. A devaluation of the exchange rate obviates the need for a period of unemployment to cut 
wages, elevate markups, and induce East Asian firms to deflate their prices. A credibility crisis 
invites speculators to attack the fixed exchange rate regime. East Asian countries are faced with a 
dilemma: Raise interest rates to deter speculation and incur an inefficient recession, or devalue the 
currency to relieve speculative pressure and risk more frequent speculative attacks in the future.   
  To sum up, the plausibility of rapid improvement in the terms of trade in East Asia creates 
circumstances which jeopardize a fixed exchange rate regime any time that a period of export 
optimism subsequently proves to be excessive. A flexible exchange rate handles fluctuations in 
export optimism smoothly by allowing the exchange rate to appreciate in response to export 
optimism and to depreciate if that optimism subsequently proves excessive.    
3. East Asian Financial Cooperation  
 Highly  integrated  regional  trade and processing of intermediate goods for export ties the 
economies of East Asia closely to each other and to fluctuations in the West's demand for exports. 
Tight trade linkages, in turn, create the potential for financial contagion in East Asia. Since the 
currency crisis in the late 1990s, the countries of the region have taken steps to cooperate on 
exchange rate policy. For instance, with the Chiang Mai Initiative agreed at the ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers' meeting in May 2000, East Asian nations moved to establish a network of bilateral 
foreign exchange swap agreements to provide liquidity support to countries experiencing balance of 
payments difficulties.
8 Although further cooperation on financial matters has moved slowly, the 
                                                 
8 Rana (2002). 8 
nations of the region continue to explore the possibility and desirability of closer financial and 
exchange rate cooperation.
9 
  The case for regional financial cooperation can be explored by thinking of a "credit union." 
A credit union is a financial intermediary that accepts deposits from and makes loans to a group of 
eligible members.  The key is that the members already share some prior association, such as 
employment in a company. A credit union economizes on the evaluation of creditworthiness, on the 
monitoring of loan covenants, and on enforcement costs of recovering a loan. For instance, the 
incentive to repay is strengthened if failure to repay is known to cost a credit union member his job. 
A credit union exploits information produced in a prior association to reduce the cost of financial 
intermediation.   
  Loans in a credit union rotate among the membership. The credit union keeps a share of its 
assets in "reserves," external securities that can be sold on short notice to fund emergency advances 
to its members. The credit union can make funds available to a member on short notice because the 
member's circumstances are well known. By exploiting the mutual knowledge of its membership, a 
credit union makes funds available to its members on better terms than an ordinary commercial 
bank, and more cheaply than can be provided individually by holding a portfolio of low-yielding 
liquid securities for self-insurance.   
  The case for financial cooperation among the governments of East Asia rests on the strength 
of the analogy to a credit union. East Asian nations constitute an association to the extent that they 
interact regularly as a result of geographical proximity, common export orientation, regional 
integration, and intergovernmental relationships. If the countries of East Asia can exchange 
information and implement surveillance processes cheaply enough on the basis of these common 
factors, then it may make sense for the countries of East Asia to engage in international credit 
                                                 
9 See Eichengreen (2006), Fujiki and Terada-Hariwara (2007), and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2006). 9 
cooperation based on bilateral foreign exchange swaps or by setting up a regional financing facility 
such as a regional monetary fund. East Asian credit cooperation would allow the countries to 
economize on their holdings of international reserves.   
    That raises the question: What can international credit policy do in addition to domestic 
interest rate policies? After all, in Section 2 we saw that if interest rate policies are employed 
independently to target domestic inflation and the exchange rate is allowed to float freely, then 
inefficient fluctuations due to sticky prices could be eliminated. There is no need for international 
cooperation on monetary or exchange rate policy to achieve efficient fluctuations relative to the 
international real business cycle core. In fact, the countries of East Asia should allow their exchange 
rates to float freely of each other to accommodate fluctuations in relative terms of trade that 
inevitably occur due to differences in the nature and pace of development.   
  To pursue this question further, we must distinguish credit policies from interest rate 
policies. Whether done collectively or bilaterally, international credit cooperation is an arrangement 
by which one country borrows international reserves from another country or group of countries in 
order to finance officially a net capital outflow in its balance of payments. Credit transactions need 
not affect national interest rates if the central banks of the countries involved adjust their balance 
sheets to sterilize the effect of credit flows on the monetary base.  
  Access to borrowed international reserves helps a country to defend its exchange rate 
without raising interest rates. A policy of "financing" a balance of payments outflow with borrowed 
international reserves as opposed to "adjusting" the interest rate or the exchange rate may be 
appropriate when a government believes that a capital outflow will be reversed soon of its own 
accord. The essence of international credit policy is that it allows a government to "buy time" 
without resorting to potentially disruptive interest rate or exchange rate adjustments.  10 
  However reasonable the potential benefits seem, there are a number of reasons to question 
the usefulness of regional credit cooperation in practice. First of all, the premise presupposes that 
there are instances when a government has information about the duration of net capital flows that 
markets do not have, otherwise one might expect private capital flows to stabilize exchange rates 
tolerably well. On the other hand, if an underlying shock turns out to require an adjustment of the 
exchange rate, then credit policy can be counterproductive and expensive by delaying the necessary 
adjustment and incurring additional costs to repay borrowed reserves.  
  The main benefit to East Asia of creating bilateral or multilateral mechanisms for borrowing 
international reserves is that such mechanisms could deter a speculative attack on a particular 
country that otherwise could spread throughout the region.  However, even this benefit of 
cooperative credit policy would be offset to the extent that it provides an incentive for investors to 
move capital into East Asia on a short-term rather than on a long-term basis with the expectation 
that a quick reversal could be financed by borrowed international reserves.  
  On balance, the scope for mutually beneficial governmental credit cooperation in East Asia 
would appear to be relatively limited. The key to efficient exchange rate behavior in East Asia is for 
each country to strengthen the institutional credibility of its own inflation targeting regime and to 
allow its exchange rate to float freely on the foreign exchange market.
10 At best, credit cooperation 
can supplement but not substitute for strong, independent monetary policies throughout the region.   
4. Bank-Dependent Finance and Corporate Bond Markets in East Asia 
  Corporate bond markets are relatively undeveloped in East Asia, making the region depend 
heavily on banks for financial intermediation.
11 Bank dependence is a legacy of relatively rapid 
development in East Asia. When economies are in a traditional state, firms are small, self-funding 
and funding by close relatives overcome problems identifying reliable borrowers and enforcing 
                                                 
10 Genberg (2006). 
11 Bank for International Settlements (2005, 2006). 11 
repayment. Relationship lending is efficient. As economies develop further, banks direct deposits to 
larger enterprises by recreating relationship lending through credit evaluation, loan monitoring, and 
managing firms in default.   
  In the West, where development progressed relatively slowly over the centuries, prominent 
firms in need of large external funding gradually bypassed information-intensive bank lending and 
accessed lenders directly with corporate bonds. In the United States the development of direct 
finance occurred simultaneously with the development of legal frameworks to deal efficiently with 
bankruptcy and investor protection.
12 Corporate governance standards were established over time to 
minimize agency costs of debt. Financial authorities promoted self-regulation of debt markets and 
encouraged rules for the disclosure of financial information. 
  Today, even firms large and visible enough to access corporate debt markets directly 
continue to employ banks for a variety of services such as lines of credit, borrowing on the basis of 
customized securities, and debtor-in-possession borrowing in bankruptcy.  Moreover, firms 
diversify their sources of credit to insure against shocks to the cost of funds in either banking or 
bond markets.
13  
  Non-financial development in East Asia proceeded too fast for institutions to develop in 
support of a corporate bond market with consequences that became evident in the last decade. 
Greenspan (1999) emphasized the "spare tire" role of a deep market in non-bank bond finance to 
cushion financial distress.  The 1997 East Asian currency crisis was exacerbated by the bank-
dependent finance because when banks collapsed there were few alternative ways for credit to flow 
to deserving borrowers. On the other hand, the 1990 collapse of real estate collateral in the US that 
hurt bank lending did not interrupt mortgage lending much because of the deep market in mortgage-
backed securities. The protracted banking crisis in Japan hurt the economy more than it might have 
                                                 
12 La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
13 Sundaresan (2005) 12 
if non-bank capital markets had been widely developed in that country. 
  The direct negative consequences for monetary policy of such developments are clear. Real 
interest rates have to be lower for longer than otherwise to deliver a given stimulus to aggregate 
demand in situations where the firms lose access to credit because of a weak banking system.  This 
is one reason why short-term interest rates were driven to the zero bound in Japan in the 1990s.  The 
lack of deep corporate bond markets affects monetary policy indirectly, too, by depriving the 
banking system of competition at the margin. Banks must compete to retain borrowers with access 
to direct finance. That discipline is likely to cause banks to be better managed, more innovative, and 
more efficient than otherwise.
14  Bank regulators benefit, too, because banks are healthier, and also 
because regulators have greater leeway to credibly enforce tough standards on banks when 
alternative avenues of finance are available to pick up the slack if need be. Regulators can exercise 
more discipline over the banking system if they are not held hostage to the fact that there is no 
alternative to bank intermediation. A financially robust banking system, in turn, is more likely to 
withstand a period of high interest rates needed from time to time to stabilize inflation. Thus, a deep 
corporate bond market indirectly enhances a central bank's credibility for low inflation.   
  Financial authorities throughout East Asia are aware of the vulnerabilities of excessive 
dependence on the banking system and have been working to broaden domestic and regional bond 
markets.  The problem is that developing a corporate bond market means breaking the monopoly of 
banking on financial intermediation.  Banking long has been home for well-connected wealthy 
businessmen and powerful political officials who collude to dominate finance and who will resist 
the loss of their monopoly. To succeed in diversifying financial intermediation fully, East Asia must 
find a way to deal effectively the political economy of finance and develop the legal, regulatory, 
and market infrastructure to allow deep and resilient bond markets to take root.        
                                                 
14 "Rating Asian Banks," (2007). 13 
5. RMB Revaluation, the US Trade Deficit, and Banking Reform in China 
  The US trade deficit with China is commonly ascribed to the fact that China keeps the RMB 
undervalued against the dollar.
15 The argument suggests that if China revalues the RMB, then the 
US trade deficit should shrink.  A benchmark two-country version of the NNS model suggests 
otherwise---that a revaluation of the exchange rate fixed by country B has little effect on country 
A's trade deficit measured in units of country A output, if country A's monetary policy targets 
inflation credibly.
16 What China needs is not a one-time revaluation of its exchange rate or a 
sequence of managed revaluations, but a flexible exchange rate to secure stable inflation and 
employment at home and to anchor the financial stability of East Asia. China can undertake modest 
banking reforms in a few years to make its banking system sufficiently robust to interest rate 
fluctuations to adopt a credible inflation target and float its currency on the foreign exchange market. 
These points about the Chinese exchange rate policy, the trade balance, and banking reform are 
elaborated below.  
5.1 Invariance of the Trade Surplus to a Revaluation of a Fixed Exchange Rate  
  Goodfriend (2007) develops a 2-country, 2-good, 2-period benchmark NNS model of 
international adjustment to explore the behavior of the balance of payments, the terms of trade, and 
aggregate fluctuations with respect to interest rate and exchange rate policies followed by two large 
countries. In the model, countries A and B each specialize in the production of a distinct composite 
of differentiated consumption goods. Representative households in A and B live for two periods---
the present and the future.  
  Households choose how much of each composite good to consume each period and supply 
work effort each period to firms which produce the consumption goods. Firms are owned 
                                                 
15 Yu Yongding (2007) provides a useful perspective on related issues. 
16 Devereux and Genberg (2007) also stress the ineffectiveness of nominal currency appreciation as a means of current 
account adjustment. 14 
domestically by households, so household income each period is the sum of domestic wages and 
profits.  Households have access to a credit market where they can borrow or lend internationally to 
consume more or less than their current income allows.  
  Households maximize lifetime utility taking as given the current and future world terms of 
trade, current and future real wages in A and B, and real interest rates in the two countries. A no-
interest-arbitrage condition links the two financial markets.  As is standard in the benchmark NNS 
model, there is no capital and all output is consumed each period. Borrowing by country A from 
country B in period 1 is reflected in a trade deficit for A and a trade surplus for B. All international 
borrowing is repaid in period 2. There are three household optimality conditions: one for the 
allocation of consumption between the two composite goods, a second for the allocation of time 
between work and leisure, and a third for the allocation of consumption over time. The model 
determines the endogenous variables in terms of exogenous variables in the two countries reflecting 
productivity levels, home good biases in consumption, and impatience to consume. 
  Country A (representing the US) is assumed to target domestic inflation with interest rate 
policy, and thereby to stabilize its actual markup at the flexible-price markup. Importantly, 
monetary policy in country A makes A's economy behave like its real business cycle core, 
regardless of what country B does. Country B (representing China) is assumed to employ its interest 
rate policy to stabilize the B-money price of A-money (the RMB-dollar exchange rate). 
  Of particular interest for the question at hand is that country A's trade balance measured in 
A-good units is independent of the terms of trade. The sign of the trade balance depends on relative 
current and future home biases in consumption in the two countries and on relative impatience to 
consume. For instance, country A has a trade deficit (and country B a trade surplus) if A households 
are more impatient than B households or if country A is expected to improve the attractiveness of its 15 
exports relative to country B, i.e., if B-household home bias in consumption is expected to decline. 
(Recall the discussion in Section 2.) 
  What happens if country B (China) revalues B-money relative to A-money (appreciates the 
RMB against the US dollar) still maintaining a fixed exchange rate? Assume that central bank A 
continues to stabilize the dollar price of A goods exactly. If the RMB price of B goods in country B 
is sticky, then the revaluation of the RMB versus the dollar makes Chinese goods more expensive 
relative to US goods. In other words, the revaluation temporarily improves the competitiveness of 
US exports to China and hurts the competitiveness of Chinese exports to the US.  
  According to the benchmark model, however, the revaluation of B's exchange rate has no 
affect on country A's trade balance measured in A-good units. The reason is as follows. First of all, 
monetary policy in country A stabilizes inflation and the markup in A, and thereby stabilizes A-
country output and income measured in A-good units.  
  Second, the exchange-rate-induced deterioration of A's terms of trade induces A households 
to substitute away from B goods and toward A goods in consumption. However, the deterioration in 
A's terms of trade also reduces the value of A-good income in terms of B goods. For separable log 
utility, the substitution effect exactly offsets the income effect, leaving unchanged the A-household 
demand for A goods. Also, the A-good value of A-household expenditure on B goods remains 
unchanged.  
  Third, the real interest rate in country A is invariant to the exchange rate revaluation. Hence, 
current relative to future A-household spending measured in A-good units is also stabilized. Since 
A-household aggregate income and aggregate consumption expenditure (both measured in A-good 
units) are each invariant to the revaluation-induced change in the terms of trade, country A's trade 
balance measured in A-good units is invariant also.     16 
  This invariance of country A's trade balance to the revaluation of country B's exchange rate 
is a consequence of features of the benchmark NNS model. Yet, those features are not unreasonable. 
And the fact that invariance holds in this case suggests that one should not expect a revaluation of 
the RMB against the dollar to have much if any effect on the US trade balance measured in units of 
US output.  
  That said, an RMB revaluation against the dollar could be helpful in another respect--to 
contain inflation inside China. According to the model, an RMB revaluation would create a 
deficiency of demand for Chinese output that would weaken labor markets and elevate markups in 
China. Such deflationary pressure on prices inside China could be useful to offset a preexisting 
inflationary compression of markups. What could cause preexisting inflationary pressure? The fixed 
exchange rate regime in China is subject to the same kind of inflationary pressure described in 
Section 2 with respect to fixed exchange rates in East Asia more generally. Under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, one might expect inflation to develop inside China as it improves the attractiveness of 
its exports to the developed world and thereby improves its terms of trade. From this perspective, an 
appreciation of the RMB against the dollar would allow China to improve its terms of trade while 
maintaining domestic price stability.
17    
5.2 Banking Reform and Exchange Rate Flexibility in China 
  The debate about Chinese exchange rate policy is reaching a critical point. If the RMB's 
value continues to be tightly managed, the United States might increase protectionist pressure 
against China to try to force a revaluation. In light of the discussion above, such actions would be 
needlessly confrontational. Goodfriend and Prasad (2007) argue that modest reforms of China's 
banking system would enable China to float its currency in a few years and put in place an 
                                                 
17 Higgins and Humpage (2005) describe the actual behavior of the Chinese real exchange rate. 17 
independent interest rate policy regime that would improve Chinese macroeconomic performance at 
home and defuse tensions abroad.   
  Independent interest rate policy requires a flexible exchange rate, not a one-off revaluation 
or a sequence of managed revaluations.  But then the exchange rate can no-longer serve as the 
nominal anchor for monetary policy. China must put in place the institutional capacity to target low 
long-run inflation credibly so that an inflation target can serve as the new nominal anchor. 
  To prepare China for independent interest rate policy Chinese banks must be made 
financially robust to fluctuations in short-term interest rates.  Financial robustness is necessary to 
allow interbank interest rates to fluctuate credibly as needed to manage independent monetary 
policy effectively. 
  The source of the robustness problem in the Chinese banking system is that Chinese banks 
have long been a primary means of financing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and many Chinese 
banks are run by local managers politically motivated (or under pressure from regional government 
officials) to direct credit to well-connected borrowers. Chinese banks are assured of a large and 
growing stock of deposits as a result of the high saving rate, capital controls, and thin debt and 
equity markets.  Under these conditions Chinese banks have had a tendency to build up non-
performing loans (NPLs) over time with the tacit approval of the government.   
  The problem is that banks whose interest earnings are significantly impaired due to NPLs 
may have cash flow sufficient only to pay relatively low interest on deposits. Since banks are tightly 
connected through the payments system and a network of interbank balances, financial distress 
anywhere threatens the entire system. A fragile banking system could make the PBC reluctant to 
raise interest rates to head off inflation. Even the perception that the PBC is reluctant to raise 
interest rates would threaten the credibility of the central bank's commitment to low inflation.  18 
  In recent years many Chinese banks have been recapitalized with funds from the large stock 
of international reserves, so balance sheets are currently in reasonably good shape. However, going 
forward the banking authorities must strengthen incentives for bank managers to make prudent 
loans to viable enterprises. Bank managers cannot be asked to lend prudently, with the expectation 
that a loan be repaid and bank capital preserved, when managers are rewarded by the political 
system for directing credit to connected borrowers or SOEs, and then largely excused for loan 
losses.     
  The Chinese authorities could put in place in a few years the necessary reforms to blunt the 
incentive for banks to accumulate NPLs, in part because the authorities have been working hard to 
strengthen the banking system for some time now. Much is at stake. The NPL problem must be 
addressed to make the banking system financially robust to interest rate fluctuations in order to 
improve monetary policy and exchange rate policy in China.   
6. International Reserve Accumulation in East Asia 
  Many central banks of East Asia have accumulated international reserves at unprecedented 
rates in recent years both absolutely and as a percentage of GDP.
18 Yet aggressive international 
reserve accumulation has had very different motives. Foreign exchange accumulation in Japan may 
have helped to deter deflation when Japanese interest rate policy was immobilized at the zero bound. 
Korea and Singapore, among others, acquired international reserves after the East Asian currency 
crisis to self-insure against another external shock.  In China, the accelerated pace of international 
reserve accumulation in recent years reflects the trade surplus and the fact that capital controls to 
protect the banking system limit the private movement of capital abroad.
19 This section reviews the 
various motives for acquiring international reserves and their relationship to monetary policy. 
6.1 International Reserve Accumulation at the Zero Bound 
                                                 
18 Alberola and Serena (2007), and Higgins and Klitgaard (2004). 
19 Green (2007). 19 
  When interest rate policy is immobilized at the zero bound in an effort to deter deflation, a 
central bank must continue to expand its balance sheet to stimulate the economy.  However, base 
money and domestic short-term securities are perfect substitutes at the zero bound, so stimulus can 
no longer by provided by conventional open market purchases of short-term domestic securities.  In 
that case, however, a central bank can provide stimulus by purchasing such assets as long-term 
bonds or foreign exchange on an unsterilized basis, i.e., with newly created base money. By 
choosing to acquire long-term bonds in the 1990s, the BOJ was able to provide additional monetary 
stimulus at the zero bound. If the outstanding stock of long-term bonds or other domestic assets to 
buy is deemed insufficient to provide the necessary stimulus, then the acquisition of international 
reserves can play an important, even an essential role in the implementation of monetary policy at 
the zero bound.    
6.2 International Reserve Accumulation for Self-Insurance 
  When interest rate policy is not immobilized at the zero bound and the exchange rate is 
flexible, operations in international reserves are not needed to implement monetary policy if there is 
an adequate stock of short-term securities for a central bank to buy.  Nevertheless, central banks of 
highly-open, export-oriented economies build up a stock of international reserves with which to 
intervene on an unsterilized basis against turbulence in foreign exchange markets. For example, 
Korea and Singapore have accumulated very large stocks of international reserves respectively even 
though each has a flexible exchange.  
  As discussed in Section 3, however, intervention in foreign exchange markets is likely to be 
of relatively limited value. Moreover, the accumulation of a very large stock of international 
reserves can be counterproductive if it causes the public to believe that the central bank will employ 
interest rate policy to stabilize the exchange rate at the expense of domestic price stability.  Benefits 20 
believed to derive from foreign exchange operations must be balanced against credibility problems 
that such operations can create for the central bank's commitment to targeting low inflation.
20 
6.3 International Reserve Accumulation with a Managed Exchange Rate and Capital Controls 
  In China, the accumulation of international reserves is dictated by the managed exchange 
rate and capital controls.  The Peoples Bank of China (PBC) acquired its large stock of international 
reserves mainly by accommodating years of net inflows of foreign direct investment at a fixed 
exchange rate and by accommodating the overall trade surplus that emerged in the last few years. 
To curb the inflationary potential of such reserve accumulation, the PBC has sterilized its 
acquisition of international reserves with sales of non-monetary central bank debt called PBC bills. 
  Many observers regard the acquisition of international reserves by the PBC as evidence that 
China undervalues its exchange rate.
21 In the absence of capital controls, however, Chinese 
residents would likely move capital out of the country privately to earn higher interest at banks 
abroad and to diversify their growing wealth in mature corporate bond and equity markets overseas. 
In light of the discussion in Section 5.2, it seems reasonable to regard the acquisition of 
international reserves by the PBC in large part as a consequence of controls on the outflow of 
capital to protect the weak Chinese banking system. If Chinese banks were made financially robust 
to higher interest rates, then interest rates could move higher to stabilize investment. Interest rate 
policy could freely and credibly target inflation, the exchange rate could be floated, and capital 
controls could be lifted.  
  Unfortunately, higher interest rates could hurt China's external balance according to the 
"current account identity" by encouraging saving and discouraging investment.
22 Even if internal 
stability were secured by worsening external balance, however, the external situation would be 
                                                 
20 Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996). 
21 United States Treasury Department (2006). 
22 Given the current high saving rate in China, the positive income effect of higher interest on spending could offset 
much of the substitution effect of higher interest on saving.  21 
improved greatly in one critical respect. China's trade surplus could no longer be ascribed to its 
manipulation of the exchange rate. The PBC would no longer need to acquire international reserves 
and instead, flexible exchange rate adjustments could encourage private capital outflows to 
accommodate China's current account surplus.      
7. Conclusion 
  The paper addressed a set of common concerns that pertain to monetary policy in East Asia.  
Broadly speaking, the concerns are rooted in the fact that the countries of East Asia have developed 
relatively quickly from command-oriented, traditional economies to modern industrialized market 
economies. The problem is that non-financial development has outrun financial development. The 
countries of East Asia recognize the problem. Governments throughout the region are working to 
improve the financial robustness of banks and deepen non-bank financial markets in order to 
strengthen the institutional capacity to target inflation and facilitate exchange rate flexibility to 
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